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SUBSTANTIAL CONFUSION ABOUT
"SUBSTANTIAL BURDENS"t
Chad Flanders*
As the Supreme Court rev1s1ts the clash between religious belief
and the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in the Zubik 1 case, it is worth mulling over a key phrase in the law that governs that clash: '·substantial burden." According to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the
government must-provided it does not meet certain other conditions,
such as showing a compelling interest-make an accommodation if it
places a ''substantial burden'' on a person's religious exercise. 2 If the
question in the Hobby Lobby case was whether a for-profit corporation
could be a ''person" that ''exercised religion," 3 the question the Court
now faces is whether the government has in fact ''substantially burdened" some religious non-profits in trying to accommodate their objection to the contraceptive mandate.4
But what is a ''substantial burden"? Or to put it another way, what
makes a burden substantial? What follows is my best effort to provide
clarity-in the form of a primer-as to the meaning of "substantial burden" under RFRA.
I. WHAT IS A ''BURDEN" ON RELIGIOUS BELIEF?

The answer to this question seems to be fairly straightforward, given
the Supreme Court's case law: a religious belief or believer is "burdened"
when the government puts some kind of pressure on someone to act con-

• Associate Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law.
t Thanks to William Baude. John lnazu and Chris Lund for comments and conversations on
earlier drafts, and tu Joe Welling, whu offered his usual expert proofreading. Michael Dorf saved me
from numerous errors on a previous iteration of this essay. This paper huilds on and updates my essay.
/ns11hst11111ial Burdens, availahlc at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm'/ahstracUd=2727423.
I. Zuhik v. 13urwell. 578 U . S . _ (2016).
2. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bh-1 (West 2015).
3. Burwell v. Hohby Lohhy Stores. Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); see generally THE RISE OF
CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (Chad Flanders, Zoe Rohinson, & Micah Schwamman, eds .. 2016).
4. Zuhik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 444 (2015) (granting certiorari on the question of the government's accommodation, appealing from Geneva Cull. v. Sec'y U.S. Dept. of Health & Human
Services, 778 F.3d 422 (3rd Cir. 2015)).
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trary to his religious beliefs.' This idea of "putting pressure on'' is important because it distinguishes RFRA's sense of burden from what we
might otherwise think is a burden. Many things can burden your exercise
of religion because they make it harder for you to practice your belief,
yet they would not count as being "burdens'' (let alone "substantial''
ones) under RFRA.
Suppose the government shuts down the road you usually take to
get to church. Or suppose it rains that day and the traffic is very bad.
Both of these "burden'' your religious belief because it will take more
than the usual effort for you to exercise your religion: they are burdens
because they make things harder for you. But neither of these things
would count as a burden under RFRA-certainly not the latter, because
it does not involve government action, but not even the former.c, A substantial burden is not just any "inconvenience on religious exercise;" it
must involve some sort of direct or indirect coercion by the state.7 Not all
bad things happening to you involve being coerced in some way.
This understanding of burden is a major lesson of Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Association. In Lyng, the government
planned on putting a road through a forest that was sacred to a Native
American tribe. The tribe sued but lost because, while destroying the
forest was certainly a bad thing for the tribe and a hindrance to them being able practice their religion, it did not put pressure on them to violate
their beliefs or change their religion. The action of the government was
not of the form, "do this, or else pay a price.'' 9 It is this element of coercion or pressure, essentially a threat by the government against you to
make you act against your beliefs, which defines something as being a
''burden'' under RFRA.m
II. WHAT DOES THE ADJECTIVE ''SUBSTANTIAL'' MODIFY?

If "burden'' means putting some pressure on a plaintiff, we have to
consider what "substantial" brings to the mix. I prefer framing the question as: what does "substantial'' modify? Here we should be careful.
There are at least two things that "substantial" could modify. First, it
5. See, e.g.. Hobhh: v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987) (noting that a �uhstantial burden is fuund when there is "suhstanlial pressure on an adhen:nt to modify his
behavior and to violate his hclicfs") (internal citation omitted).
6. Things might he different if the government had purposely destroyed the road, just to get at
your religion. But I think this would still be the hasis or something other than a RFRA claim (perhaps
a claim under the free exercise clause).
7. Midmh Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004).
8. 485 U.S. 439 (1988); see also Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
9. Sherherl v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (slating that a suhstanlial hurden is when an
in<lividual is made lo "choose hclween following the precepL� of her religion and forfeiting hcnefits. on
the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion . . . on the other").
10. Lyng. 485 U.S. at 450 (noting that a suhslanlial hurden exists when the government action
has "[a] tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious hclicfs"). l l follows. too,
that merely heing offended hy something the government docs is not enough lo count ,L� a burden.
While "hcing offcndt.:<l" may make it har<ler for you lo practice your n.:ligion, if the government is not
pulling you to II choice, then there is no "hur<len."
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could be that the government has to put substantial or heavy pressure on
you to violate your religious beliefs. But it could also be that the government has to pressure you to violate your religious beliefs in some substantial or serious way. For example, maybe the government is asking you
to violate a particularly important tenet of your religion, not just some
discretionary one.
In other words, "substantial" could either refer to the quantum of
pressure you are facing to violate your beliefs-is it a lot or a little? Or it
could refer to how serious an imposition on your religion the government
action has to be-is it a big intrusion or little one? The statute taken as a
whole, I admit, could be interpreted as applying "substantial'' to modify
both pressure and religious belief. That is, "substantial burden" under
RFRA might mean you face substantial pressure to substantially violate
your religion-that the pressure is strong and affects a really important
or vital part of your beliefs. 11
Some courts have insisted that substantial refers to the degree or
scope of the supposed religious violation, viz., that the push for you to
give up or change your religious beliefs should not just be something that
affects a minor or optional part of your belief system, but should really
cut into the core of your religious practice. As a result, these courts have
held that slight infringements-an observant prisoner misses a couple of
religious meals, for instance-do not count because they are "de minimis.''12 It may be a burden, but it is not a "substantial one'' if it only requires a slight deviation from or a slight violation of your religious practice; even if there is a lot of pressure on you to make that deviation or
commit that violation.
The better view is that "substantial" applies only to the quantum of
pressure that is put on a person to violate his religious beliefs-that
means any part of his religious beliefs, and for any amount of time. This
is true for both a statutory reason and a philosophical one. The statutory
reason is that the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA)-which retroactively applies to RFRA's definition of religion-explained that an exercise of religion should mean ''any exercise
of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief."13 If ''substantial burden'' means something like ''burdening

11. In other words, therc could he LARGE pressure lo make you violate your helicfs in a
SMALL way (I lhrealcn lo kill you if you do not do some minor and optional acl of n:ligious devotion); there could be SMALL pn:ssure lo make you violate your beliefs in a LARGE way (I will line
you a penny unkss you desecrate your house of worship); and then: could he LARGE prcssurcs for
LARGE violations. Arc all of !hes.: "substantial hurdcns" or just some of lhcm'/
12. See. e.g.• Norwood v. Strada, 249 F. App'x 269,272 (3rd Cir. 2007) ("The issue here. howo:vcr, is much more circumscribed; ii is whclher a short denial of such a [religious] diet during an o:mergency lockdown was a 'suhstantial hurden,' or a mac do: minimis intrusion."); see also id. (collccting
cases).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000): see also Burwell v. Hohby Lobby Stores. Inc . 134 S. Ct. 2751,
2761-62 (2014) (discussing the enactment of RLUIPA).
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a central part of the person's religious belief system," then this is plainly
ruled out by the statute. 14
On a more theoretical level, courts have traditionally been, and
should now be, reluctant to determine whether or not a violation of this
or that part of someone's religion is "substantial" or "'insubstantial.'' Can
a court really say that missing one or two religious meals is "de minimis''
and therefore not a big deal (or an "insubstantial burden")? But this second-guessing is exactly what the courts would have to do if we interpreted '"substantially burden'' to mean '"cause someone to violate an important or major part of his belief system." How are courts supposed to know
whether or not the law is pressuring a person to violate an important or
unimportant part of her belief system, or compromising her belief massively or only slightly, without undertaking a searching and (for that reason) problematic theological inquiry? What to one person might be a
slight or '"attenuated" imposition on her religious practice may be to another a very serious cost.
Courts cannot and should not have to adjudicate this point. They
should instead assess whether there is a large amount of pressure ('"substantial" pressure) being put on the person to violate her beliefs. The
plaintiff still must show that the government is pressuring her to violate
some part of her religion, 15 but she should not have the burden of showing that what the government is pressuring her to do makes up an important, central, or substantial part of her religious exercise. Absent a
finding that the plaintiff is being insincere, the issue of whether the law is
affecting a really important part of his or her religion should largely go
unchallenged. After all, if it was not important, why sue in the first place?
I l l . WHAT MAKES THE PRESSURE ON BELIEF "SUBSTANTIAL"?

The main use of the word "substantial" in the Hobby Lobby opinion itself refers correctly to the quantum of pressure the person faces to
violate some part of her religious belief system. The burden on Hobby
Lobby to violate its religious beliefs is "'substantial,'' the Court ruled, in
part because if Hobby Lobby did not cover contraceptives it would have
to pay a hefty tax bill-upwards of $15 million dollars a year. 16 Or, if
Hobby Lobby instead dropped insurance coverage and its employees
qualified for subsidies on the state exchanges, they might have to pay $26

14. For a good statement of this point, sec E. Texas Baptist Univ. v. Scbelius, 988 F. Supp. 2d
743. 764 (S.D. Tex. 2013) rev'd sub nom. E. Texas Baptist Univ. v. Burwell. 793 F.3d 449 (5th Cir.
2015).
15. See Hcrnamh:z v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680. 699 (1989) ("We do, however, have doubt� whether
the alleged burden imposed by the deduction disallowancc on the Scicnlologists' practices is a substantial one. Ndther the payment nor the n:ceipt of taxes is forbidden by the Scientology faith generally.
and Scientology docs not proscribe the payment of taxes in connection with auditing or training sessions specifically.").
16. See Hobby Lobby. 134 S. Ct. al 2757.
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million in penalties. 17 Thus, it appears that a large fine counts as a substantial pressure under RFRA, and that seems right.
This leaves open many questions. For example, is there some point
at which a fine would not be enough to count as "substantial"? If the fine
were just $50 dollars, would this be insufficient pressure on a relatively
well-off for-profit company? The logic of Justice Alito's opinion points in
this direction, but other considerations may lead us to say that any fine
could be "substantial.'' We did not know the amount of the welfare benefits Mrs. Sherbert risked giving up in Sherbert v. Verner/ 8 but it certainly
was not in the millions. Additionally, in w;sconsin v. Yoder, it seems that
the Amish might have only been assessed a $50 fine if they failed to send
their kids to public school; were these burdens therefore "insubstantial''?19
It would be great if we could get more clarity here. Unfortunately,
for reasons I spell out in the next section, it does not look like this will be
much of an issue in the Zubik litigation,21 1so clarification likely will not be
forthcoming.
IV. How DOES THIS APPLY TO THE ZUBIK CASE?
I will be rather brief and perfunctory in how I see the above primer
as helping to illuminate the latest case.
1. Many appellate courts have seen this as a "no burden'' case along
the lines of Lyng. This is incorrect. The government may no longer
be requiring the plaintiffs to pay for contraception, but they are requiring them to indicate that they want an accommodation. This
puts them to a choice: the plaintiffs either have to affirmatively notify the government that they want an accommodation or not cover
contraception and pay the fines. There is a burden here, because
the government is pressuring them to do something- ''do this, or
else pay a price." It is not just a case of plaintiffs objecting to something they do not like that the government is doing by itself to
someone else, and which makes it harder for them to practice their
religion. They are objecting to something in particular (for example,
having to sipn a form) that they are being forced to do and do not
want to do.2 ·
2. The plaintiffs, nonetheless, have to show that notifying the government that they want an accommodation is a violation of their
sincerely held religious beliefs-not a violation of an important or
17. See id.
18. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
19. ·•·Whoever violates this section . . . may he lined not less than $5 nor more than $50 ur imprisoned not more than 3 months or hoth.'"' 406 U.S. 2115, 207 (1972) (4uoting WIS. STAT.§ 118.15
( 1969)).
20. Zuhik v. Burwell. 578 U . S . _ (�016).
21. "So when Wheaton Colk:ge tells us that it is hcing 'forccd" to allow •use' of its health plans lo
cover emcrgcncy contraceptives. ii is wrong. It"s being ·forced' only to notify its insurers . . . . ·
Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 791 F.3d 792, 795 (7th Cir. 2015) (emphasis added).
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central belief, but a religious belief they hold. I assume they will be
able to do this under some theory of complicity; and the courts
should defer to the plaintiffs' assessment of their beliefs, if they are
sincere. I gather that the complicity theory goes something like this,
''we do not want to have any part in how this contraceptive system
is being run, even if we are not in any way financially liable. We are
tainted by our participation-which may seem small to you, but is a
big deal to us.''
3. If the fine they have to pay is roughly the same as the Hobby
Lobby fine, or even less, then there is not only a burden on the
plaintiffs, but a ''substantial" one. This, incidentally, is why the
Court will not have to confront the question of how big a fine there
has to be for the pressure to be "substantial" - the fine here is plenty big.
4. Of course, this does not mean the plaintiffs will win, only that
they have not lost at the first stage, viz., the stage at which they
have to show their religious belief has been substantially burdened.
It has.
V . SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON THE ORAL ARGUMENT AND
DECISION IN ZUBIK

In the Zubik oral argument, the Solicitor General strained to avoid
any questions about substantial burden-leading Justice Kennedy at one
point to ask if he was in fact conceding that there was a substantial burden.22 General Verrilli insisted he was not, but one could see why he was
trying so hard to skirt the issue. Talking about how a religious believer's
beliefs are not being seriously affected when the believer says they are is
hard, especially when you admit up front that you are not questioning
the believer's sincerity. You need to figure out a rule that says when a
belief is important and affected enough that the believer's ability to practice his belief is "substantially" compromised-and you have to say that
you can tell, better than the believer can, when this is the case.
My analysis counsels that courts should avoid taking the bait; instead they should move on to the analysis of whether there is a compelling governmental interest and a least restrictive means. Do not get me
wrong, this kind of analysis is hard. But it is, if there is such a thing, a
good kind of hard. 23 It is the kind of hard that courts are good, or good
22. Transcript of Oral Argument al 45, Zuhik ,,, Hurwcll. 578 U . S . _ (2016) (No. 14-1418)
("JUSTICE KENNEDY: And is ii fair fur me lo infer from the way you open your remarks that you
conce<lc that there is a suhstantial burden here? And the question then is what is a permissible accommodation'/ What's the least restrictive alternative'/ Do you concede that thcn.:'s a substantial burden'/").
23. The somewhat surprisin� order in the case docs not change my undcrslan<lin_g of how the
ca�c should be decided. See Order. Zubik v. Rurwdl, 578 11. S. _ _ (2016) (No. 14-1418) (filed Mar.
29, 20 I ti). What the order asks. in short. is whether there is some other least restrictive means that
docs not burden the plaintiffs at all. This is pn.:cisdy the threshold question of whether there is a burden on the plaintiffs (of the sort that pressures them to do something "or else"), or just something
happening that the plaintiffs do not like or find olfcnsive. If the Court linds that there is an alternative
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enough, at handling. They are hard questions of secular governmental
policies and ends, and whether and how the government can achieve
them. Courts should avoid questions that involve questions that are the
bad kind of hard-the hard that involves trying to figure out what someone else's religion means, and telling them when they are or are not suffering a '·substantial burden." And nothing in the Court's evasive decision in Zubik24 changes this fact: they have only put off the decision for a
further day. The hard questions they have yet to tackle still remain; and
the hard questions courts should never tackle are rightly put off, and
should be put off indefinitely.2.1

means ror the government lo achieve its compelling interest, which involves no burden on the plaintiffs, then the plaintiffs should win and the government should adopt that alternative means. Ir there is
a hurden. however, then the Court should go on to decide whether the compelling interest in this case
is compelling enough. Again, neither path requires the Court to explore whether the burden is "substantial" or not. They only need lo consider whether there is a hurden in the first place.
24. Zuhik v. Burwell. 578 U . S . _ (2016).
25. I have analy7cd the Zubik opinion in more detail in a post on SCOTUShlog. See Chad
Flanders, Srm1wsi11m: /1110 rhe Weeds, SCOTUSBLOG (l\fay lo. 2111h, 3:04 PM), hltp://www.�cotu,hlo!!
.c, ,m/2016/0�/s.�mp, 1,Hun-inlo-thc-wccds/.

